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Abstract
This paper applies the legal framework of forum shopping to three levels of Sino-Indian
relations: bilateral border disputes, regional balancing, and multilateral competition. Brantly
Womack’s asymmetric power theory is often used to explain the behavior of India and China,
two emerging states of unequal capabilities.

However, shown by the application of forum

shopping, his theory fails to consider the increasing costs to non-cooperation as relations move
into the regional and multilateral realms. Multilateral competition is, therefore, the forum with
the highest likelihood of Sino-Indian cooperation, which can spill over and reduce tensions in
bilateral and regional relations as well.
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Introduction
In a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh at the 2013 BRICS summit, Xi described the two states as “the world’s two
largest developing nations with a similar historic mission to boost their social and economic
development.”1 While BRICS summits are just one forum in which China and India interact, an
analysis of their bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations paint pictures quite different than
Xi’s idealistic statement. As competition increasingly divides these two emerging powers, the
policy decisions made by both New Delhi and Beijing do not always reflect this sense of a
shared historic mission.
Applying the legal framework of “forum shopping,” the paper will analyze three forums
of Sino-Indian relations—bilateral border disputes, regional balancing in the Indian Ocean and
Southeast Asia (SEA), and multilateral power competition—to expose how each emerging power
views the other.2 Traditionally, scholars have relied on Brantly Womack’s asymmetric power
theory to examine Chinese relations with its neighbors, including India. Using a model of a
larger state (A) and a smaller state (B), Womack predicts how neighboring states with
asymmetric capabilities will interact.3 As he explains, B has proportionally more to gain or lose
in its relationship with A than A does in its relationship with B.4 The consequent asymmetry in
vulnerabilities creates different expectations for the relationship:

B primarily wants A to

acknowledge its autonomy, while A primarily expects deference from B—meaning B
acknowledges the real difference in power between the two states.5 If an action of the opposing
state breaches these expectations, both states feel threatened, and a vicious, conflictual cycle
between B’s search for recognized autonomy and A’s search for deference will emerge.6 Overall,
Womack’s asymmetry theory concludes that actions taken by A will have a greater impact on B
than that of B on A, which has characterized the relationship between China (A) and India (B)
since the takeoff of Chinese economic growth.7
However, while the ongoing border disputes between China and India follow asymmetry
theory’s policy predictions, the cases of regional balancing and global power competition
uncover a changing Sino-Indian dynamic. In the case of each country’s economic presence and
political influence in the Southeast Asian region, India’s security involvement in the Indian
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Ocean and “Look East Policy” interfere with Beijing’s goal of regional hegemony, thus
challenging its own asymmetric relations with China. Moreover, relative soft power and shared
interests in multipolarity at the multilateral level are essential to India’s ability to defy its
traditionally asymmetric relations with China. Although Womack predicts that any disturbance
in an asymmetric power relationship will cause conflict between state A and state B, the pressure
for cooperation at the global level will improve Sino-Indian relations overall, as the costs of noncooperation multiply. Thus, multilateralism is the ideal forum for India to equalize its current
asymmetric balance with China.

Forum 1: Border Disputes in Sino-Indian Bilateral Relations
Borders have played a vital role in Sino-Chinese bilateral relations since the 1950
Chinese annexation of Tibet, immediately following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in China’s 1949 civil war.8 Since that 1950 annexation, border disputes between China
and India have been a principle source of distrust between the two powers, which has reinforced
their asymmetric power relationship. India—the smaller state—has worried for the past halfcentury about Chinese security presence along its borders, and China has done very little to
assuage such fears among Indian leaders and scholars.
asymmetric nature of bilateral Sino-Indian relations:

Two border disputes exemplify this

the cases of Tibet and the Jammu and

Kashmir region.

Tibet and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
The Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950 eliminated the historic buffer space between
colonial India and China, which left some Indian leaders uneasy.9 China viewed Tibet as a part
of its empire stolen by European imperial powers, and this annexation is just one example of
China’s attempts to win back lost lands through negotiations with neighbors.10 Despite their
concern over this aggressive CCP border policy, Indian leaders agreed to sign the Panchsheel
Agreement of 1954, which not only recognized Chinese control of Tibet but also established the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between China and India.11 The Five Principles include
the following—largely superficial—rules for Sino-Indian bilateral relations: respect for each
5! of !19
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other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s
domestic affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.12
Although Indian leaders pushed to include these principles in the main text of the Panchsheel
Agreement, China succeeded in downplaying their significance by limiting the principles to the
preamble.13
It is, therefore, not surprising that distrust grew into an armed conflict along the border
area of Tibet in 1962, which created a “Nehru-induced delusion”—referring to the postindependence Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—that India was a victim of unprovoked
Chinese aggression. 14 To apply Womack’s theory to this victimization, China, the larger power,
invaded the autonomy of India, the smaller power. Not only did Nehru create this sense of
victimhood among Indian leaders but his views supporting Tibet’s independence also infringed
on what China viewed as its historical right to the area.15 Distrust and suspicion continued to
grow, for the actions of both the larger state and the smaller state invaded their respective desires
for deference and autonomy. Shen Dingli argues that China and India’s “problematic handling”
of this border dispute prevented the long-term cultivation of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, thus foregoing the opportunity to build a bilateral partnership at an early stage in
their relations.16 This conflictual beginning to Sino-Indian politics hurt their historic capability
to cooperate bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally, as distrust continued to plague their
asymmetric relationship.
Rajiv Sikri argues that Tibet remains “the single most important factor driving SinoIndian relations,” a view that originated from Mao Zedong and still influences contemporary
Chinese thinking.17 In fact, the Beijing Review, News from China, and People’s Daily Online—
all publications controlled by the CCP—still reiterate that Tibet is a part of modern China.18
Although China’s hold on Tibet has become more economically motivated, the Tibet question
continues to cloud Sino-Indian relations. It enforces the asymmetric power relation between the
two states, for Indian leaders—just as they did when signing the Panchsheel Agreement—have
been unable or unwilling to counter growing Chinese security and economic presence. This
border dispute will remain a major challenge to Sino-Indian bilateral relations as long as both
powers abide by the predictions from Womack’s asymmetry theory.
6! of !19
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The Princely States of Jammu and Kashmir
In addition to Tibet, the princely states of Jammu and Kashmir between India and
Pakistan are a notable source of Sino-Indian border conflict. The complicated history of these
two princely states dates back to March 26, 1846, when the Treaty of Amritsar drew out their
borders following the Anglo-Sikh War.19 In 1947, the princely states were divided into three
main sub-units:

India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and

Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of which Pakistan ceded to China in 1963.20 Pakistan gave
over 5,000 square miles of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory to China as a part of a border agreement,
which arguably marked the beginning of today’s close Sino-Pakistan relationship.21 However,
the cooperation between China and Pakistan since that agreement has only enforced suspicions
among Indian leaders, and as long as Sino-Pakistan relations remain strong, Sino-Indian bilateral
relations are unlikely to improve.
Even excluding China’s presence in the Jammu and Kashmir region, India sees Kashmir
—a majority Muslim province in secular India—as “a jewel in the crown of Indian
nationalism.”22 At the same time, Pakistan, a Muslim-majority country, views Kashmir as a part
of its own nation, following the arguments of the post-independence “two-nation theory” of
Pakistan and India.23 Pakistan’s ceding of the Gilgit-Baltistan region to China further threatened
the deeply identity-based rationale for India’s partition of the princely states. Similar to the
Chinese image of Tibet as belonging to the “motherland” of China, India views Jammu and
Kashmir as belonging to its own motherland.24 This border dispute, thus, exemplifies Womack’s
asymmetry theory in that China, the larger state, does not care about India’s rationale for
controlling Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, does not accept Indian autonomy. Furthermore,
the role of Pakistan in the case of Jammu and Kashmir further complicates the asymmetry, as
China cooperates with a historical adversary of India.
In the past few years, the political significance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region has
expanded with Chinese economic growth.

In November 2014, the Chinese government

committed 45.6 billion US dollars to the building of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), which will run directly through Gilgit-Baltistan and give China direct access to
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.25 Because of the region’s rich hydro resources, mineral wealth, and
7! of !19
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forest reserves, Priyanka Singh argues that it is “almost impossible” to imagine CPEC without
Gilgit-Baltistan.26 Not only will CPEC increase China’s economic stakes in Pakistan but it will
also inevitably increase Chinese security presence along India’s northwest border in the Jammu
and Kashmir region.27

An increased Chinese economic and security presence along this

contested border area will further invade Indian autonomy, but China has shown no concern for
such an intrusion. CPEC, therefore, very clearly exposes both China’s indifference towards India
and its expectation for deference from its less-powerful southern neighbor.
To conclude, the border disputes along Tibet and the Jammu and Kashmir region still
greatly define—and impede—Sino-Indian bilateral cooperation. Border disputes are the origin
of a significant amount of distrust between the two powers, which will continue as long as China
intrudes into Indian domestic autonomy. This analysis of border disputes shows that Womack’s
asymmetry theory does apply to the Sino-Indian relationship today, and as a result, bilateral
relations are the least likely forum for a softening of their asymmetric power balance. Neither
India nor China will likely overcome their conflicting historical or economic interests in these
border regions, therefore preventing future cooperation.

Forum 2: Regional Cooperation and Competition in Asia
As China and India grow economically, both powers will compete for increased security
presence in the Indian Ocean and greater economic cooperation with Southeast Asia (SEA).
Sino-Indian regional balancing actually presents an opportunity to transform their asymmetric
relationship, for India’s “Look East Policy” (LEP) intrudes upon the traditionally asymmetric
power relations between Southeast Asian nations and China. China’s growing presence in both
the Indian Ocean and SEA poses three potential outcomes that require a consequently aggressive
Indian regional policy: Beijing as a maritime power, Beijing as a maritime economy, and Beijing
as a “polygonal power” in both security and economics.28 At the same time, India’s increased
maritime involvement creates new dynamics for China’s regional policy. This second forum of
Sino-Indian relations, thus, presents a transition from the two countries’ very asymmetric
bilateral relations to more balanced regional competition.
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Security in the Indian Ocean
Indian and Chinese maritime strategy has grown more aggressive in the Indian Ocean,
reflecting a slight shift in their asymmetry. China sees ocean politics as a “new frontier,” not
only to consolidate its regional power but also to ensure its access to global markets.29

In

addition to CPEC, other policy actions recently taken by China in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)
include the construction of ports, pipelines, and commercial bases—some of which run directly
through India’s South Asian neighbors.30

At first, New Delhi ignored China’s expansionary

strategy across the Indian Ocean because its leaders falsely believed Beijing would fail to
challenge Indian IOR dominance.31 However, while New Delhi failed to respond, China built
ports in Sri Lanka, deployed nuclear submarines in Karachi, and strengthened its security ties
with various countries in SEA. 32 Once the Indian government realized the extent of China’s
threat to their regional dominance, New Delhi adopted more aggressive policy in the IOR.
The past decade saw two shifts in India’s maritime policy.

First, India boosted the

protection of its coastline following the Mumbai attacks of 2008, in which Pakistani terrorists
sailed to the coast of Mumbai.33 Second, and with greater implications for Chinese presence in
the IOR, New Delhi updated is naval strategy in 2015 with a shift from “using” its surrounding
seas to “securing” them.34 India hopes to transform itself from a passive beneficiary of its IOR
access to an active security provider in the Indian Ocean, in order to balance Chinese security
presence in the region. While China continues to construct ports and improve its access to the
Indian Ocean, current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced his commitment to
“consolidating India’s maritime ties and collaborating with Indian neighbors on maritime
security.” 35 In contrast with border disputes, New Delhi’s more active rhetoric and policy in the
Indian Ocean exposes the importance of regional balancing in the evening of their asymmetric
relationship.
New Delhi’s overall regional security architecture does not include single-power
domination over the Indian Ocean. 36

While not explicitly stating that it aspires for such

domination, Beijing has focused on a regional security environment in which mutual trust
guarantees stability and bridges policy differences “through dialogue on an equal footing.”37
Thus, the IOR region is potentially a space of both competition and cooperation between India
9! of !19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

9

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4

and China, as both share common interests in regional stability and securing access to global
markets.38 However, India’s response to Chinese aggression renders the Indian Ocean the first
potential forum that challenges Womack’s asymmetry theory.

ASEAN in Sino-Indian Regional Competition
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand founded the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) on August 8, 1967, and its role in Sino-Indian relations has grown as
both powers attempt to expand their regional influence. 39 Originally envisioned to be a “riskavoiding organization,” these countries created ASEAN to minimize the threat of conflict either
within the region or with external actors.40 Since the boom in Chinese economic growth, SinoASEAN relations represent an easy application of Womack’s asymmetry theory, even more so
than that of India and China.

ASEAN includes relatively small states that do not pose a

challenge to China’s rise globally or regionally.

However, India’s Look East Policy (LEP),

which was originally proposed in 1991, interferes with the traditional asymmetric balance
between ASEAN and China.41 By interfering in the Sino-ASEAN relationship, New Delhi has
proven not only that it is a rising regional power but also that this rise corresponds with an
alteration in its own asymmetry with China.
The Look East Policy has two primary policy focuses: increased economic integration
with ASEAN and a strengthened security architecture between India and the region. Although
LEP originally sought to enhance India’s global position after the Cold War, the first formal
arrangements between India and ASEAN began in the early 2000s with the signing of various
free trade agreements.42 In 2009, total trade between India and ASEAN was 39.1 billion US
dollars, but this trade volume grew 41.8 percent in 2010, to 55.4 billion US dollars.43 This 2010
volume constitutes about 2.7 percent of total ASEAN trade.44 As comparison, Sino-ASEAN
trade totaled about 362.9 billion US dollars in 2011, which constituted an increase by nearly 24
percent compared to 2010.45

Although these numbers show China’s trade dominance with

Southeast Asia, the foundation of the ASEAN-Indian Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) in 2010
was a “milestone” achievement of India’s Look East Policy.46 Furthermore, some scholars point
to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as another opportunity for Indian
! of !19
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integration into the Southeast-Asian trade network.47 India’s increased trade with its eastern
neighbors, along with agreements like RCEP and the AIFTA, are essential for New Delhi’s
attempt to balance China in the region. As the Indian economy continues to grow, its Look East
Policy will make cooperation with India even more appealing to the ASEAN nations.
The second and more recent tenant of LEP aims to improve security cooperation within
Southeast Asia.

In fact, under current Prime Minister Modi, the Look East Policy has

transitioned into an “Act East” policy, meaning that Indian actions in Southeast Asia have
intensified in both economic and strategic scope.48 While the original Look East Policy focused
primarily on the economic benefits of trade with ASEAN, this Act East policy stance responds to
China’s growing security presence in the region.49 New Delhi has endorsed an open, inclusive,
and “polycentric” security environment in Southeast Asia.50 In addition, the unofficial Act East
policy includes increased defense spending and political engagements with ASEAN, such as the
provision of patrol vessels and lines of credit to the region. 51 The increasingly active Indian
security cooperation with ASEAN nations, along with its economic integration, contrasts
significantly with Indian policy in bilateral relations. New Delhi will likely become a serious
regional player, and in the process, it may be able to force some deference from China in the
region. This reversal in asymmetry—or, more likely, evening of asymmetry—results in part
from the addition of actors in regional balancing.

Involvement with ASEAN nations will

determine the future of India and China’s ability to balance, and potentially cooperate, in
Southeast Asia.
Looking at China’s attitude towards the Look East Policy, a 2011 editorial in the official
newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), PLA Daily, argued that New Delhi’s
new security posture was an attempt to contain China.52 While public discourse acknowledges
India’s growing regional influence, Beijing’s criticism of LEP often contains doubt that India
will become an active regional leader. 53 The asymmetric power balance theory, therefore, still
exists at the regional level at least to the extent that China has yet to see India as a challenger to
its own regional goals. Nonetheless, security and economic competition renders the regional
forum more promising for the equalization of Sino-Indian asymmetry than the bilateral forum.
As China and India compete for political, naval, and economic influence in the Indian Ocean and
! of !19
11
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018

11

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Southeast Asia, the former may eventually defer to the growing power of the latter—thus defying
Womack’s theory.

Forum 3: Coexistence in a Multipolar World Order
The third and final forum of Sino-Indian relations is multilateralism. As discussed above,
domestic border disputes enforced Womack’s theory of asymmetric power politics, and changes
in regional balancing present nascent transformations in how the states cooperate and compete
with each other.

However, their participation in global policy forums like the BRICS and

Bretton Woods institutions marks a new evolution of how China and India see each other.54
These two emerging powers share an interest in multipolarity, and through both the expansion of
Indian soft power and the global restraints on Chinese actions, New Delhi can defy the
asymmetry defining their relationship today. In a truly multipolar global system, India will no
longer ask for recognized autonomy from China, and China will no longer be able to demand
deference from India.

Soft Power in BRICS Leadership
The BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—challenge the
traditional division between developing and developed countries. Two of these nations—India
and China—distinguish themselves from the other three members of this abbreviation, for their
population and economic growth have made them models for other developing countries. As
stated at the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012, the member countries present a
platform “for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43 percent of the
world’s population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.”55 With the BRICS nations accounting
for about half of global economic growth today, cooperation between India and China will be
essential to bring global attention to developing-country interests.56 Strong leadership is required
for the BRICS to succeed, and it thus presents an opportunity for India to challenge Chinese
economic domination with normative appeals to other developing countries.

! of !19
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Starting with Beijing’s approach to the BRICS, many Chinese scholars see the forum as a
pathway to challenge traditional United States (US) hegemony. Promising to never act as a
hegemony, Chinese foreign policy has historically centered on the autonomy of all nations.57 To
achieve autonomy and a multipolar system, Chinese scholars point to two key trends that must
occur: first, a high level of global economic and financial integration; and second, the multipolarization of global politics.58 The focus on economic integration explains China’s
collaboration with the other BRICS powers, whose simultaneous growth is essential to the
challenge of the current US-dominated world order. In contrast with China’s outwardly antiWestern attitude, India’s approach to the BRICS—along with the Group of 20 (G-20)—has
primarily addressed issues of economic and political global governance in general. 59

This

difference in approach to the BRICS marks a key opportunity for India to represent developing
nations in a way that China has failed to do so. Because the BRICS institutions represent a new
world order with greater power in the hands of developing nations, New Delhi should focus on
harnessing its soft power to advance its position among the BRICS.
Joseph Nye, who first established the theory of soft power in international relations,
defines it as the “attraction that makes others want what you want.”60 Soft power differs from
coercion, or what Nye calls “sticks,” and economic payment, or “carrots,” in that it rests on the
ability to shape the preferences of others to align with one’s own.61 Following to a certain extent
their overall visions of the BRICS, Indian and Chinese soft-power strategy will be a key
determinant in their leadership of other developing nations. For instance, China’s soft power
relies heavily on the appeal of its growing economy, which coincides with expanded Chinese
foreign investment and humanitarian aid in developing countries.62 On the other hand, being the
world’s largest democracy, Indian soft power derives from its image as a political model for
developing nations.63 Amit Kumar Gupta explains that India’s soft-power strategy has also
centered on capacity building among developing nations, whereas China primarily directs its
resources towards infrastructure building.64 If India continues to distinguish itself from China as
a democratic state that works to improve the political and economic capacity of its fellow
developing countries, it will strengthen both its soft power and its leadership presence among the
BRICS.65 Womack’s theory, which focuses on the physical or economic size of states, fails to
! of !19
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consider the role soft power plays in the relative global positions of states.

In some cases,

relative soft power can be more important to a state’s ability to cooperate multilaterally than pure
economic power, which is essential to India’s emerging leadership in the BRICS.

Bretton Woods, Multipolarity, and Mutual Interests
In addition to soft power in BRICS leadership, the Bretton Woods institutions reveal the
shared stakes China and India have in multipolarity. Because Chinese scholars see global
economic integration as a necessary element for multipolarity, Beijing’s critiques of the Bretton
Woods institutions provide insight into Chinese multilateral strategy. For instance, Beijing has
criticized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for their lack of
transparency and slow pace of voting-rights reform, which favor the US and other Western
powers based on their monetary contribution to the institution. 66

The Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) are direct responses to
the lack of reform of these Bretton Woods institutions, respectively.67 Finally, exposing the
tension between Beijing’s vision for international trade and that of Washington, D.C., China has
been involved in more anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) than expected at its entry.68 Overall, Beijing’s approach to challenging
these Bretton Woods institutions exposes its attempts to balance the US and Europe.
Arndt Michael calls India’s approach to multipolarity and global institutions “Panchsheel
Multilateralism,” which refers back to New Delhi’s emphasis on peaceful coexistence as outlined
in its 1954 agreement with China.69 Following the ideal of multipolar peaceful coexistence of all
states, Indian discourse in regards to the Bretton Woods institutions focuses on the
democratization of the decision-making process.70 In the IMF, India has criticized the slow pace
of voting rights reform similar to China, but it has also called for more general reform of the
governance structure, to improve equality among states parties.71 Next, New Delhi has demanded
that World Bank policy become friendlier to developing societies and economies.72

Finally,

India has faced anti-dumping and countervailing trade disputes in the WTO, but in contrast with
China, complaints have rarely come from the US and Europe.73 For India, the Bretton Woods
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institutions, thus, provide an opportunity to promote greater equality between the global North
and South.
Although Sino-Indian competition still exists at the global level, the root of their interests
in reform lies in one shared goal: multipolarity. Whether the world eventually follows India’s
norm-based, Panchsheel Multilateralism or China’s economic-based, anti-Western
multilateralism, both powers’ stakes in multipolarity create a policy forum for Sino-Indian
cooperation.74

Neither India nor China can reform institutions like those of Bretton Woods

without the other, so the intersection of multilateral interests defies Womack’s theory of
asymmetric power balancing. If we base Sino-Indian relations solely on each state’s size or
economic might, China would be Womack’s state A, or the large power. However, with the
addition of variables like soft power and shared interests, India becomes more important to
China’s long-term policy goals. As the difference in power between the two states diminishes on
the multilateral stage, China can no longer expect complete deference from India. Womack’s
asymmetry theory crumbles in this third forum, which explains why multilateralism is the ideal
forum for Sino-Indian relations. Not only does the division between Indian and Chinese power
diminish in global interactions, but the likelihood of conflict falls with multilateral cooperation
compared to borders disputes. With widening mutual interests, the multilateral forum increases
the costs of non-cooperation, therefore forcing both India and China to cooperate in ways
unlikely in their bilateral and regional relations.

Conclusion
Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric power relations predicts that when power
asymmetries exist, a larger power will demand deference and a smaller power will demand
autonomy.75 Applying Womack’s theory to Sino-Indian relations at the bilateral, regional, and
multilateral level, this paper found that an asymmetric power balance primarily exists in the first
of these three policy forums. Regional and multilateral competition mark a transition in the
balance between India and China, in which the costs of non-cooperation expand with the number
of external state actors and the overlapping of political interests. Consequently, the larger the cost
of non-cooperation, the less asymmetric both players become. New Delhi and Beijing may still
! of !19
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see each other as competitors, but the future symmetry of Sino-Indian relations lies in their
ability to peacefully balance and collaborate multilaterally. Cooperation has already occurred,
and will likely continue, in this third forum of their complex relationship. As former Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized in various speeches, the world does have enough
space for the growth ambitions of India and China, and this space begins with their participation
in multilateral institutions.76
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